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INTRODUCTION
In four out of four opportunities during the current round of redistricting litigation, the Supreme Court sided with plaintiffs challenging redistricting plans adopted by Republican-controlled state
legislatures as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.1 These challenges arose in response to the Republican post-2010 census redistricting “playbook” in numerous states, a strategy “of packing as
many black voters into black districts so that the surrounding districts would be [more] white,” and thus, more conservative.2 In each
case, legislatures “hid[ ] behind the public cover of [a] cartoon of the
Voting Rights Act [(VRA)],” using it as an “excuse to overpack a district with cohesive minority voters, well beyond the level needed to
actually comply with the Act’s mandates,” and thus “bleaching the
perceived threat of minority voting power in neighboring areas.”3 In
each case, the plaintiffs successfully argued that the districts at
issue were (or could be understood as) unconstitutional racial
gerrymanders, whose contours were not compelled by the VRA.4
This is a somewhat unexpected state of affairs, in several respects. First, the fact that racial gerrymandering claims are now
being brought primarily by liberal plaintiffs is a surprising development. Voting rights advocates were often harsh critics of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1990s, beginning with Shaw v. Reno
(Shaw I ), which established racial gerrymandering as a cause of
action.5 These cases, which I will refer to as the “first-generation” of
1. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481-82 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794-95 (2017); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1734
(2016) (decided on standing grounds), dismissing appeal from Page v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL 3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015) (three-judge court); Ala.
Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262-63 (2015).
2. See Richard Wolf, Court to Weigh Use of Race in Drawing Political Lines, USA TODAY
(Sept. 1, 2014, 2:49 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ politics/2014/09/01/supremecourt-redistricting-race-alabama/14628029 [https://perma.cc/ M3K5-L5E9] (quoting David
Bositis).
3. Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 573, 609 (2016).
4. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1481-82; Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 794-95; Wittman, 136 S. Ct.
at 1734; Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1262-63.
5. 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). See generally Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why
Voting Is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201 (1996) (criticizing Shaw I for incorporating racial

2018]

RACIAL GERRYMANDERING LITIGATION

1889

racial gerrymandering cases, were generally brought by conservatives challenging districts that had been created for the purpose of
enhancing minority representation.6 But now, the charge of racial
gerrymandering is being deployed more frequently by minority voting rights advocates.7
Second, the fact that these cases are being won before the Roberts
Court—which liberals have frequently characterized as hostile to
voting rights,8 particularly in the wake of its decision invalidating
a key provision of the VRA in Shelby County v. Holder9—is probably
not something that most practitioners in this space would have
predicted at the beginning of this redistricting cycle. But the plaintiffs in these cases are 4-for-4 thus far.10
Trying to understand these developments is complicated by the
fact that they have unfolded in an era of “conjoined polarization,”
that is, an alignment of political contestation along racial lines mapping onto partisan divisions.11 That adds a layer of complexity in
attempting to analyze what I will call, for the purposes of this Article, the “second-generation” of racial gerrymandering cases. Are
these second-generation racial gerrymandering cases about race?
Are they about party? Some new mixture of the two?
In these brief comments, I will describe and assess three different
ways of understanding these second-generation racial gerrymandering cases.

gerrymandering into traditional equal protection analysis).
6. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 633.
7. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1262.
8. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, The Supreme Court’s Hostility to the Voting Rights Act, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/opinion/13wed4.html [https://
perma.cc/QBE6-MV2M]; Ian Millhiser, The Double Standard Behind the Roberts Court’s
Hostility to Voting Rights, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 27, 2013, 10:20 PM), https://thinkprogress.
org/the-double-standard-behind-the-roberts-courts-hostility-to-voting-rights-390b965f30df/
[https://perma.cc/8YVA-PFEE].
9. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
10. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481-82 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794-95 (2017); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1734
(2016), dismissing appeal from Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL
3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015) (three-judge court); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct.
at 1262-63.
11. See generally Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization
and Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867 (2016) (evaluating the effects of conjoined polarization on redistricting and election administration litigation).
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Something Old: Excessive Race Consciousness. Perhaps the easiest way to understand these cases is that they are simply what the
plaintiffs and the Court have said they are: just another iteration of
racial gerrymandering cases, premised on the notion that excessive
race consciousness in redistricting violates the Constitution.12 As I
explain below, this approach understands these cases as fundamentally about process—in other words, how and to what extent officials
may consider race when redistricting.
Something New: Partisan Gerrymandering. Another way of understanding these cases is that they represent something “new”—a
novel way of getting at what is best understood as a partisan harm,
but framed in the legally cognizable language of race. Obviously,
partisan gerrymandering itself is not something “new”—it has existed perhaps since the founding.13 But, from this perspective, race
and partisanship have aligned in a new way in contemporary politics, and the second-generation racial gerrymandering cases really
represent a new way to attack a fundamentally partisan, rather
than racial, harm.
Something Really Old: Intentional Racial Discrimination. A third
way of understanding these cases is that they are fundamentally
about state action arising from racially (rather than partisan-based)
discriminatory intent. In this sense, the harm that the second-generation racial gerrymandering cases seek to address is something
“really” old: the precise injury that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were adopted to prohibit, namely, intentional statesponsored racial discrimination.14
Each of these ways of understanding the second-generation racial gerrymandering cases implies a prescription. If these cases are
just more of the same, then they can and should be litigated in basically the same way that the “old” racial gerrymandering cases
were.15 If instead these are cases “really” about partisanship, then
perhaps they should be litigated as such, under “new” legal theories

12. See, e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463.
13. See Emily Barasch, The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twistedhistory-of-gerrymandering-in-american-politics/262369/ [https://perma.cc/7FAN-TZYX].
14. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV.
15. See infra Part I.
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premised on a requirement of partisan fairness.16 From this
perspective, doing so might be simpler and perhaps more honest
than using race as a proxy for party. Or, if these cases are fundamentally about intentional racial discrimination, then perhaps we
need to litigate them as such, using “really old” legal claims based
simply on discriminatory intent.17
None of these frames provides a complete answer. But in my
view, as a purely descriptive matter, contemporary redistricting
battles, and voting rights disputes in general, cannot be understood
fully in purely nonracial partisan terms. It is far too simple to say
that these cases are about party rather than race, which ahistorically suggests that politics in America can be boiled down to an essential deracinated form. Race has always been, and remains, a
highly salient factor in voting rights disputes, which cannot be fully
appreciated through a purely partisan lens.18
That observation counsels against not only a primarily partisanbased understanding of the recent racial gerrymandering cases, but
also a framework that views these cases as simply newer versions
of Shaw I. Rather than acknowledging the continuing role that race
plays in American politics, the first-generation racial gerrymandering cases treated the mere consideration of race as a constitutional evil in itself.19 The second-generation racial gerrymandering
cases, however, are different. Although they employ the color-blind
language of Shaw I, they arise from disputes about alleged “packing” of Black voters into as few districts as possible, and a recognition that such packing diminishes the political influence of Black
voters in neighboring majority-white districts, and thus, across a
state as a whole.20 That is, while the Court premised Shaw I on the
notion that racial considerations, when predominant, are suspect,
and sought to turn the redistricting process away from race,21 the
second-generation racial gerrymandering cases arguably do something different. They express a demand for more finely tuned

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 5, at 1220-21.
See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1993).
See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (2015).
See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642-43.
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calibration of racial considerations, rather than a suspicion of race
as an appropriate redistricting criterion altogether.22
That is because these cases—or at least, the plaintiffs’ animating
concerns in these cases—are fundamentally not about instantiating colorblindness as a procedural goal, but rather addressing the
substantive goal of reversing the deleterious effects that post-2010
redistricting plans have had on the political influence of communities of color in many places. Instead of efforts to stamp out racial
considerations, these cases are better understood as attempts to
remediate purposeful efforts to cabin the influence of minority
voters. In other words, these cases seek to root out intentional
efforts to discriminate on the basis of race.23
What does this mean as a prescriptive matter? Here I am more
equivocal. The second-generation racial gerrymandering cases have
been extremely successful, and I am not suggesting abandoning
them.24 Meanwhile, with respect to partisan-centric strategies, I
agree that civil rights advocates should explore and develop nonrace-based legal theories. Nonetheless, I suggest that we consider
bringing intentional racial discrimination claims more frequently,
or at least recasting the racial predominance inquiry in intent-based
terms.25 Below, I will attempt to sketch out some preliminary
thoughts as to what such claims might look like in practice.26
Bringing such claims may be difficult, because they require additional evidence of intent that is not typically necessary for Shaw I
claims. But reframing these cases around intentional discrimination
rather than racial predominance would be more broadly consistent
with how the civil rights community understands these particular
redistricting battles, and racial justice disputes more generally.27
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481-82 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794-95 (2017); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1734
(2016), dismissing appeal from Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL
3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015) (three-judge court); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct.
at 1262-63.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See, e.g., N.C. STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP, RESOLUTION OF THE NC NAACP TO
THE NATIONAL NAACP BOARD TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC BOY COTT OF NORTH CAROLINA UNTIL IT REPEALS CERTAIN LAWS 1 (2017), https://www.naacp.org/
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I. SOMETHING OLD: EXCESSIVE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS?
The first way of understanding the recent wave of racial gerrymandering cases is to conceptualize them as just another set of
racial gerrymandering cases akin to Shaw I. The story goes something like this: whereas conservatives developed the racial gerrymandering cause of action to challenge redistricting plans featuring
majority-minority districts as relying excessively on race,28 now it is
conservatives who are drawing majority-minority districts and, in
so doing, are improperly employing racial considerations.29 And they
must be held to the same standards proscribing excessive racial
considerations in the redistricting process. The identity of the perpetrators has changed but the basic harm is essentially the same.
There is both a descriptive claim here (that the new racial gerrymandering cases are, in essence, materially the same as the firstgeneration cases, in that they both identify excessive consideration
of race as the underlying evil meriting constitutional scrutiny) and
a prescriptive one (that turnabout is fair play, and civil rights advocates should be happy to use the racial gerrymandering cause of
action as a tool to advance minority representation).
Let us take the descriptive claim first. Fundamentally, the firstgeneration racial gerrymandering cases are about process, as
distinct from intent or results.30 Shaw I held that a constitutional
injury occurs when racial considerations predominate the redistricting process, regardless of whether the state engaged in such
race-conscious line-drawing for the purpose of helping or harming
members of a particular racial group.31 That is, it does not matter
whether the state sought to limit the political power of members of
a racial group, or to provide a historically disenfranchised group

wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Resolution-of-National-Board-as-Proposed-by-NC-StateConference.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFM7-N7GX].
28. See, e.g., Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993).
29. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. 1257.
30. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 641-42.
31. See id. at 657.
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with greater electoral opportunity.32 Regardless of intent, excessive
consideration of race is constitutionally suspect.33
Moreover, the actual results—at least in terms of the distribution
of political power—are similarly irrelevant to the analysis. The
white plaintiffs in Shaw I did not assert that their voting power
was impermissibly diminished in some respect; nor could they, because white voters in North Carolina already had more than their
share of proportional representation,34 which functions as a sort of
benchmark in vote dilution cases.35
Thus, the Shaw cases were not discriminatory animus cases
based on improper motive; nor were they vote dilution cases based
on discriminatory effect.36 They were a new kind of race case (at
least in the redistricting context), in which the plaintiffs’ claim was
based on an improper decision-making process.37 To the extent that
the effects of a tainted process matter, it is not because the process
harms one particular group, but because of the effect that the process has on the body politic as a whole.38
As Richard Pildes famously observed, the Shaw cases seemed to
be based on a conception of expressive injury.39 In other words, excessive race consciousness in redistricting is constitutionally problematic because it sends a particular message:
It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or
32. See id. at 653.
33. See, e.g., id. at 642, 651 (“[R]acial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they
may be said to burden or benefit the races equally.”).
34. See id. at 650 (rejecting Justice David Souter’s dissenting view “that racial gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group’s voting strength,” and holding that
“reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to
elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency
as a whole”).
35. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167-68
(1977) (White, J.).
36. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 637.
37. See id. at 641-42.
38. See id. at 647-48, 657.
39. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH . L. REV.
483, 485 (1993).
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the community in which they live—think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls ...[,] and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency
as a whole.40

The problem with racial gerrymandering, therefore, was not that
the government sought to harm a racial group (intent), or that it
actually diminished a group’s political power (effect); it was that the
government communicated a message of racial difference that, in
the Court’s view, is antithetical to the colorblindness demanded by
the Equal Protection Clause.41
At first glance, the second-generation Shaw cases seem to follow
a similar path. One rule that appears to have emerged from these
cases is that the use of hard numerical targets for the minority voting-age population (VAP) of a particular district amounts to using
race as a predominant factor in redistricting, and thus triggers strict
scrutiny.42 In Cooper v. Harris, which considered the constitutionality of the same congressional district at issue in Shaw, the Court
held, as it did in Shaw I, that strict scrutiny was triggered “regardless of [the] ultimate objective in taking th[e] step” of placing a
particular number of voters in a district on the basis of their race.43
And, as in Shaw I, the Court’s decision did not turn on the effect of
the redistricting plan in terms of the distribution of political power
among voters of different racial groups. The consideration of race as
a predominant factor formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ legal claim,
regardless of the reason that the legislature considered race, or the
effect that its race-based decision-making may have had on the
voting power of a particular racial group.
But I question whether, as a descriptive matter, it makes sense
to view Cooper, and other second-generation racial gerrymandering
40. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647, 650.
41. See id.
42. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468-69 (2017) (finding strict scrutiny was
triggered because “the State’s mapmakers, in considering District 1, purposefully established
a racial target: African-Americans should make up no less than a majority of the voting-age
population”); see also Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 799, 801
(2017).
43. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1473 n.7.

1896

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1887

cases, as just another iteration of Shaw I. Although the Court’s
decisions in these cases pay some lip service to the idea of expressive injury,44 they do not employ the same kind of charged rhetoric
present in Shaw’s description of race-conscious redistricting as
“bear[ing] an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.”45
The absence of such framing probably stems in part from the fact
that somewhat different concerns animated the plaintiffs in this
more recent wave of cases.46 Indeed, trying to understand these
cases within the Shaw excessive race-consciousness framework obscures what it was that the plaintiffs in these cases were concerned
about—not the excessive consideration of race, but the use of race
to diminish minority political power outside of majority-minority
districts.47
The oral argument in the first of these cases, arising from
Alabama, highlighted the fact that a concern about excessive race
consciousness per se does not really explain the plaintiffs’ motives
in these cases. Counsel for the plaintiffs in the Alabama case began
argument as follows:
MR. PILDES: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:
Alabama employed rigid racial quotas, rigid racial targets to
design all its black majority districts based on mere racial
statistics alone, and then used only racial demographic data to
meet those targets with astonishing precision.48

An illuminating exchange occurred a few minutes later with Justice Samuel Alito:
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, you began by -- by criticizing Alabama
for supposedly imposing quotas. But listening to your argument,
44. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015)
(identifying the injuries of racial gerrymandering as “includ[ing] being ‘personally ... subjected
to [a] racial classification,’ as well as being represented by a legislator who believes his
‘primary obligation is to represent only the members’ of a particular racial group.” (alterations
in original) (first quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957 (1996); and then quoting Shaw I,
509 U.S. at 648)).
45. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647.
46. Compare id. at 637, with Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1263.
47. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1263.
48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (No.
13-895) (emphasis added).
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it sounds to me that you are just as interested in quotas. You’re
just interested in lower quotas.
MR. PILDES: Your Honor, right -JUSTICE ALITO: So if you -- if they want to keep it at 70 percent, that’s -- that may be illegitimate in your view. But if they
take it down to the minimum that would be required in order to
produce the desired result, that’s a -- that’s a -- a permissible
quota. So why are you using this term “quota” at all?
MR. PILDES: We don’t have to use the word “quota.”
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, why did you use it?
MR. PILDES: I actually meant to use the word “racial targets.”
Judge Thompson used the word -JUSTICE ALITO: You think there’s a difference between the
two?
MR. PILDES: Well, there’s a lot of rhetorical and inflammatory
power in the word “quota.”49

What Justice Alito’s question got at is the fact that an objection
to race consciousness per se does not seem to be animating these
plaintiffs.50 Rather than seeking to force the State to abandon or
reduce the consideration of race in the redistricting process as an
end in itself (or as a means to achieving an expressive goal about
colorblindness), the plaintiffs in these cases sought only to lower the
minority VAP of these districts.51
This is in part because what is necessary to provide minority voters with a modicum of political power has changed. In previous
decades, Black registration and turnout lagged well behind white
participation rates, and given high levels of racial polarization,
many districts had to be super-majority Black to provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in conformity with the VRA’s requirements (65 percent was the rule of
thumb).52 Now, however, as gaps in Black and white participation
rates have shrunk in some states, and as polarization levels have
49. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1263.
52. See Dale E. Ho, Two Fs for Formalism: Interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
in Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral Patterns, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 403,
414-15, 414 n.69 (2015) (citing United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 164 (1977) (plurality opinion)). See generally Kimball Brace et al., Minority Voting
Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice, 10 LAW & POL’Y 43 (1988)).
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changed, districts in some places can, in voting rights parlance,
“perform” for Black voters at a lower minority VAP level than was
necessary in the past.53
Nevertheless, after the 2010 census, many Republican-dominated
state legislatures sought to hyperconcentrate Black voters in as few
districts as possible, at levels higher than necessary to achieve VRA
compliance, in a manner that reduced the influence of Black voters
in surrounding majority-white districts.54 In response, the (often
Democratic Party-affiliated) plaintiffs in these second-generation
cases sought to transfer “excess” minority voters to neighboring districts, so as to render those districts more competitive, while maintaining Black opportunity districts at slightly lower Black VAP
levels that would continue to perform for Black voters.55 In other
words, the plaintiffs sought not to prevent the consideration of
race, but rather to calibrate its use more precisely in the service of
enhancing minority voting power.56
To be sure, as others and I have noted, the state legislatures in
these cases employed a formalistic approach to the VRA that
perversely resulted in more race consciousness than was necessary
to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their
preferred candidates.57 But the quantum of race consciousness by
the states in their line-drawing processes does not seem to be
driving the plaintiffs in these cases. Rather than procedural (in
other words, whether states consider race) the plaintiff ’s concerns
appear to be substantive: namely, the bleaching of districts adjacent
to majority-Black districts, which had the effect of minimizing Black
voters’ influence in those districts and, thus, across the state as a
whole.58
This is somewhat different from the process-based and expressive concerns animating the first-generation racial gerrymandering cases.59 Rather than seeking to turn the redistricting process
away from the consideration of race, these cases can be viewed as
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Ho, supra note 52, at 415.
See Levitt, supra note 3, at 609.
See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465-66 (2017).
See id.
See Ho, supra note 52, at 424-26; see also, e.g., Levitt, supra note 3, at 592-94.
See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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requiring more finely grained attention to race and requiring legislatures to determine with greater detail just the right amount of
minority VAP necessary in a district to provide an opportunity to
elect.
Perhaps this disjuncture is fine. There is, after all, some poetic
justice in flipping the racial gerrymandering cause of action—
which was initially deployed to weaken minority voter power60—to
further minority voting rights. And these cases have been very
successful in the current Supreme Court.61
But I offer a few caveats. Narrowly speaking, I question whether,
as a prescriptive matter, civil rights advocates rely too heavily on
this approach, which rests on the interplay of two rules that are in
some tension with each other. On the one hand, these cases hold
that numerical racial targets are constitutionally suspect.62 On the
other hand, they assume (without definitively ruling) that racial
targets may be permitted if a case-by-case functional analysis demonstrates that they are necessary to provide minority voters with an
opportunity to elect their preferred candidates in conformity with
the VRA.63
The jurisprudence around the intersection of race and redistricting is already incredibly complicated, and it is difficult to predict
how the interplay of these two rules will continue to play out in
practice. But one can imagine numerous scenarios that could rebound to the detriment of minority voting rights. For example,
assume that racial polarization increases—which appears to be
happening in at least some regions of the country.64 If that happens,
districts that currently perform for voters of color at their current
60. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 636-37 (1993).
61. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481-82 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794-95 (2017); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1734
(2016), dismissing appeal from Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL
3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015) (three-judge court); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262-63 (2015).
62. See, e.g., Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1476 & nn.10-12 (suggesting that “deliberately” drawing
a district “as a majority-minority district” will trigger strict scrutiny).
63. See id. at 1469-71.
64. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in
the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 206 (2013); Dale Ho, Minority Vote Dilution in the Age
of Obama, 47 U. RICH . L. REV. 1041, 1066 (2013).
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minority VAP levels might not in the future, unless the minority
VAP in those districts is increased to offset higher levels of racial
polarization in the electorate. This problem could grow as incumbent minority-preferred elected officials retire, and future minoritypreferred candidates compete for open seats without an incumbency
bonus.65 In other words, the Goldilocks level of the “just right”
amount of minority VAP for a district could shift higher. But, civil
rights advocates would then be placed in the challenging position
of having to argue that minority VAP levels that were previously
deemed indicative of impermissible race-conscious gerrymanders
are now in fact necessary to provide minority voters with electoral
opportunity in compliance with the VRA.66 Maybe that concern can
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis with strong expert testimony,
but it is not an easy place from which to start litigating.
Another danger is that, in treating bright-line rules with skepticism, Cooper affords more discretion to legislatures that might be
hostile to minority voting rights.67 Cooper went so far as to intimate
that, if a non-majority-minority district was already “performing”
for minority voters, then the Gingles preconditions for section 2 vote
dilution liability could not be met.68 Under such circumstances, “‘[i]t
is difficult to see how the majority-bloc-voting requirement could be
met’—and hence how § 2 liability could be established.”69 In other
words, one could read Cooper as suggesting that any district that
currently performs with less than a majority-minority VAP lacks
any protection under section 2’s results standard.70
If that is correct, then during the next round of redistricting, hostile jurisdictions could seek to reduce minority voting power by
65. “The incumbency advantage is perhaps the best-established effect in American elections.” Nate Cohn, Debate Is Over: Gerrymandering Is Crucial to G.O.P.’s Hold on House, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/upshot/its-time-to-end-the-olddebate-over-gerrymandering.html [https://perma.cc/64YY-74TT].
66. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
67. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1468-69 (rejecting the use of racial quotas that subordinated other legitimate criteria in the districting process).
68. See id. at 1470.
69. See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 16 (2009)
(plurality opinion)).
70. Bartlett v. Strickland made clear that, under certain circumstances, dismantling such
a district could still violate section 2’s prohibition on intentional discrimination. See 556 U.S.
1, 19-20 (2009) (plurality opinion).
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switching away from their post-2010 strategy of packing minority
voters into as few districts as possible, and instead resort to
cracking minority communities apart.71 Districts that once provided
for minority opportunity at less than 50 percent VAP could be
drawn down even further, to the point that they no longer perform.72
And the legislatures that employ such a strategy could point to
Cooper and argue that, wherever 50 percent minority VAP is unnecessary to provide minority voters an opportunity to elect their
preferred candidates, section 2 protections are inapplicable.73 That
would permit legislatures to ignore racial considerations altogether
in many circumstances.
Speaking more broadly, it may also be counterproductive for civil
rights advocates to embrace colorblindness as a constitutional
principle, which has been deployed to undermine race-conscious civil
rights remedies in a range of areas, including education74 and
employment.75 Although the first-generation racial gerrymandering
cases obviously did not categorically prohibit the use of race in the
redistricting process (but only as a “predominant” factor), they expressed such a deep skepticism about race-conscious state action
that at least some commentators during the 1990s worried that
these cases marked a first step toward just such a categorical prohibition.76 They embody the same process-based conception of racial
discrimination that enabled the Court in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin to find that a white student had standing to
challenge the University of Texas’s race-conscious admissions program,77 even if the student would not have been admitted under a
race-neutral admissions policy.78 This misguided understanding of
71. See id. (inferring that districts with less than a majority-minority VAP lack protection
under the result prong of section 2 of the VRA).
72. See id.
73. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470.
74. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (plurality opinion).
75. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009).
76. See, e.g., James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott’s Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting Cases
as Badges of Slavery, 39 HOW . L.J. 633, 660 (1996).
77. See 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
78. As Ilya Somin has explained, whether Fisher could have been admitted to the
University of Texas was wholly irrelevant to her claim:
Some defenders of affirmative action suggest that the Fisher case challenging
racial preferences at the University of Texas, is somehow improper because
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racial discrimination suggests that we should, wherever possible,
avoid thinking about race when, to combat racial injustice, we
should be doing precisely the opposite.79
Of course, we should not be unrealistic here. Formal colorblindness shows no signs of retreating as the dominant mode of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause when it comes to race.80 And civil
rights advocates should not forgo tactical advantages for their
clients in individual cases in the hope that maintaining doctrinal
consistency will, in the long run, somehow ground equal protection
in a more meaningful conception of substantive equality. In representing our clients, we have to use whatever tools are available
and accept the risk that any particular strategy could backfire.
But treating race consciousness as a constitutional bugaboo risks
reifying a false equivalence between genuine (and under the VRA,
legitimate) efforts to provide members of historically disenfranchised racial and ethnic minority groups with an opportunity to
elect their preferred candidates, and pretextual invocations of the
VRA to justify redistricting plans that sap communities of color of
political power outside of a few hyperconcentrated districts.81

Abigail Fisher’s grades and test scores were not good enough for her to be admitted even in the absence of preferences for black and Hispanic applicants. Even
if this is true, it is legally irrelevant. The Fisher case is not about whether
Abigail Fisher deserved to be admitted to the University of Texas, but about her
constitutional right to a nondiscriminatory admissions process. It is not about
how strong her application was, but about whether the University of Texas was
justified in judging it by different standards than those used to evaluate black
and Hispanic applicants.
Ilya Somin, Why It Does Not Matter Whether Abigail Fisher Would Have Gotten into the University of Texas in the Absence of Racial Preferences, WASH . POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/14/whyit-does-not-matter-whether-abigail-fisher-would-have-gotten-into-the-university-of-texas-inthe-absence-of-racial-preferences/?utm_term=.9c78c918b7b5 [https:// perma.cc/D22U-K9DS].
79. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights
& Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly
and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.”).
80. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”).
81. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (2015)
(describing Alabama’s use of the VRA to justify racial gerrymandering).
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And there is something problematic about embracing this processbased conception of racial discrimination in the redistricting context, while arguing against it in other contexts.82 As my ACLU
colleagues argued in their amicus brief in Fisher:
The historical purpose of equal protection and of the strict
scrutiny standard was to secure the rights and equal opportunities of disenfranchised people. This history affirms the importance of attention to persisting inequalities in conducting equal
protection analysis. Far from a position of blanket skepticism,
equal protection contemplates and at times even necessitates
race-conscious measures to secure the guarantee of equality.
Application of strict scrutiny in this case upends the original
conceptions of equal protection and strict scrutiny.83

Ultimately, civil rights advocates must serve their clients’ interests,
and should rely on arguments that are most likely to be well-received by the courts. But we should exercise caution in embracing
a theory premised on the notion that essentially any consideration
of race triggers constitutional scrutiny.
II. SOMETHING NEW: “PARTY ALL THE TIME?”
A second way of understanding the second-generation racial
gerrymandering cases is that they are really about something entirely separate from race: partisanship. That is, we can understand
these cases as efforts to use race as a mere proxy for partisanship—that Republicans sought to entrench their power vis-à-vis
Democrats, and, knowing that Black voters tend to vote for Democrats, they packed Black voters into as few districts as possible, in
order to minimize the Democratic Party’s power. Arguably, the gerrymanders at issue harm not only Democrats (in the sense that they
deprive them of their “fair share” of voting power); they are injurious to democracy itself, because they distort the will of the electorate, potentially in a counter-majoritarian manner by entrenching
82. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union & the ACLU of Texas as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 11, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No.
14-981).
83. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
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a minority political party in power.84 Democratic accountability
therefore demands nonpartisan reforms.
Again, there is both a descriptive claim here and a prescriptive
one. The descriptive claim is that these cases are not “really” about
race, but about party.85 As Sam Issacharoff put it, “[T]he category
of race increasingly fails to capture the primary motivation for
what has become a battlefield in partisan wars.”86 Rick Hasen,
without unequivocally endorsing it, described this in his contribution to this Symposium as “the party all the time approach to the
conjoined polarization question.”87
From a “party all the time” diagnosis, there tends to flow a prescription to “party” less (or perhaps nonparty more): in other words,
given that these cases are really about party, the appropriate aim
of reform should be on greater partisan fairness. Litigants could
simplify the doctrine considerably by simply “litigat[ing] these cases
not as race cases but as party cases, having courts rule that certain
partisan actions are themselves illegal.”88
There is a lot of explanatory power in this partisan-focused lens.
Surveying the recent adoption of “vote denial” practices that reduce
access to the franchise in many states, Professor Issacharoff noted:
[T]he single predictor necessary to determine whether a state
will impose voter-access restrictions is whether Republicans
control the ballot-access process. This is not intended as a normative claim, but simply as a real-world fact of life. Voting
restrictions are not only likely to be found in Republicancontrolled jurisdictions, but are also likely to be similar in kind
across those jurisdictions.89

84. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 795-96 (2017)
(describing Virginia’s use of racial gerrymandering to achieve political outcomes).
85. See Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1406 (2015).
86. Id.
87. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three
Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Rights Cases, 59
WM . & MARY L. REV. 1837, 1876 (2018). To be clear, I do not understand Professor Hasen to
suggest that the “party all the time” approach fully explains the nature of contemporary
voting rights disputes, or that it is a panacea for them.
88. See id.
89. Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 1370.
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The media has largely adopted this frame in covering recent voting
rights controversies, characterizing them as clashes between Republicans who seek to restrict the franchise and Democrats who seek to
expand access, with each party pursuing agendas that serve their
respective electoral advantage.90
Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to disentangle race and partisanship, as we have entered an era of what commentators have
termed “conjoined polarization.”91 As the Court noted in Cooper, because “racial identification is highly correlated with political affiliation,”92 “political and racial reasons are capable of yielding similar
oddities in a district’s boundaries.”93 This phenomenon may make
it more difficult in the future to replicate successful racial gerrymandering litigation strategies, in part by complicating racial
polarization analysis: given conjoined polarization, polarized voting
patterns might be interpreted as partisan in nature, rather than
racial.94
In my view, however, a “party all the time” approach does not
fully capture the fundamentally racialized nature of contemporary
voting rights disputes. Race still has strong explanatory power in
terms of predicting political behavior.95 In Cooper, for example, the
State’s own expert witness testified that race was a better predictor
of vote choice in North Carolina than party affiliation, at least in
presidential elections.96
And the relatively recent wave of new state-level restrictions on
voting, such as voter identification requirements, is difficult to

90. See, e.g., Alex Altman & Maya Rhodan, Blue States Make Voting Easier as Red States
Add Restrictions, TIME (Oct. 20, 2015), http://time.com/4080238/voting-rights-red-blue-states2016/ [https://perma.cc/Z477-VQMQ].
91. See Cain & Zhang, supra note 11, at 869.
92. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473 (2017) (quoting Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie
II ), 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001)).
93. Id.
94. See Cain & Zhang, supra note 11, at 886.
95. See id. at 873.
96. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1477 n.14 (noting that the state’s own expert testified that
“voting data from the 2008 Presidential election ... tracked race better than it did party registration”); see also N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 225 (4th Cir.
2016) (“As one of the State’s experts conceded, ‘in North Carolina, African-American race is
a better predictor for voting Democratic than party registration.’”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
1399 (2017).
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understand if race is taken out of the picture.97 Now, it is certainly
true that Republican-controlled legislatures enact such restrictions
far more frequently (indeed, almost exclusively).98 But one recent
study found that, while “a change to Republican control of the legislature or governorship dramatically increases the likelihood a state
will pass an ID law, ... the effects of these shifts in political power
are larger in states with large minority populations.”99 That is,
while it is true that a change to Republican control of a state government is highly correlated with the adoption of new restrictions
on voting, newly empowered Republicans are “more likely to enact
a number of these laws in states with large Black and Latino populations.”100 Another recent study found that support for stringent
voter identification requirements correlated not only with partisanship, but also with indicia of racial resentment.101 All of this suggests that contemporary voting controversies cannot be explained
exclusively—or perhaps even chiefly—through a partisan lens.
97. See, e.g., S.M., North Carolina Voter ID Law Is Struck Down as Racially Discriminatory, ECONOMIST (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2016/
08/its-duck [https://perma.cc/L6MP-B3PE].
98. See Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 1370.
99. See Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, Understanding the Adoption of Voter
Identification Laws in the American States, 45 AM . POL. RES. 560, 562 (2017).
100. See id. at 580. Republican control, by itself, does not appear to be a sufficient condition
for the adoption of new restrictions on voting, as states with small minority populations tend
not to have adopted new restrictions on voting in the last ten years. For example, of the top
ten states in terms of non-Hispanic white population percentage, see QuickFacts: White Alone,
Percent, July 1, 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/map/US/
RHI125216 [https://perma.cc/4586-J9HT], seven have state legislatures and governorships
controlled by Republicans: Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wyoming, see Gubernatorial and Legislative Party Control of State Government, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial_and_legislative_party_control_of_state_government
[https://perma.cc/6HJA-NDPX]. Of those seven states, none currently has a strict photo ID
requirement for voting. See Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(June 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx [https://
perma.cc/3LXK-2A2A]. Anecdotally, states have only adopted strict voter identification requirements under full GOP control. Compare id., with BALLOTPEDIA, supra. But it seems that
the states that have done so—like Texas or Georgia, see NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
supra—have substantial minority populations, perhaps rendering these states more susceptible to political contestation along racial lines.
101. See David C. Wilson & Paul R. Brewer, The Foundations of Public Opinion on Voter
ID Laws: Political Predispositions, Racial Resentment, and Information Effects, 77 PUB. OPIN ION Q. 962, 980 (2013) (“[W]e see that racial resentment has its strongest effects among
liberals, many of whom support voter ID laws while possessing no clear ideological justifications for doing so.”).
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An exclusive focus on partisanship not only misrepresents the
present, but also it obscures the past. In its purest form, one could
interpret a “party all the time” framework as suggesting that contemporary voting rights disputes are best understood as arising
from differences about policy (or perhaps ideology), wholly distinct
from issues of race. But an absolute distinction between policy and
race does not, and probably never has, existed.102 The racial discrimination fights of the past were very much about policy.103 It was not
as though opponents of voting rights sought to disempower African
Americans exclusively out of a free-standing desire to subjugate;
rather, African American disenfranchisement in the Jim Crow
South had downstream consequences in terms of representation,
and thus, policy, which was largely the point.104 Conflicts about
policy were always a component of the struggle for racial justice.105
In that sense, the partisan framework also makes it harder to apprehend the future properly. The Trump era has coincided not only
with conjoined partisan and racial polarization, but also more specifically, with a high correlation between racial resentment and candidate choice.106 And the Trump presidency itself has already had
profound policy consequences for racial justice issues—with crackdowns on undocumented immigration,107 proposals to limit legal
immigration,108 the Muslim travel ban,109 and possible challenges to
102. See RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
ENFRANCHISEMENT 138 (2004).
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., id. at 131-39.
105. See, e.g., id.
106. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, Two New Studies Find Racial Anxiety Is the Biggest
Driver of Support for Trump, WASH . POST: WONKBLOG (June 6, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/06/racial-anxiety-is-a-huge-driver-of-support-for-donaldtrump-two-new-studies-find/?utm_term=.8f92900abed4 [https://perma.cc/S4T9-2DM9];
Michael Tesler, Views About Race Mattered More in Electing Trump than in Electing Obama,
WASH . POST: MONKEY CAGE (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/11/22/peoples-views-about-race-mattered-more-in-electing-trump-than-inelecting-obama/?utm_term=.91c275fe1503 [https://perma.cc/D5VG-MVEX].
107. See, e.g., Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Administration Targets Parents in New Immigration Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/us/trumparrest-undocumented-immigrants.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/GF6Q-AMR6].
108. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Supports Plan to Cut Legal Immigration by Half, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/us/politics/trump-immigration.
html [https://perma.cc/7RW5-RDMH].
109. See, e.g., Emily Stephenson & Eric Knecht, Trump Bars Door to Refugees, Visitors
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affirmative action in college and university admissions on behalf of
white applicants.110 It seems like an overclaim to suggest that this
political moment, and those that are to come, can be best understood
through a lens that downplays the role of race.
What about as a prescriptive matter? Even if everything above is
100 percent correct, it does not necessarily follow that race-based
remedies are the best path forward. For their part, Professors
Issacharoff and Hasen both suggest that a renewed focus on nonrace-based reform and legal strategies could represent a more
productive path forward for voting rights advocates. Professor
Issacharoff proposes federal administrative curbs on partisan
abuses,111 while Professor Hasen suggests that it could be “a more
sensible approach to police partisanship in redistricting directly
than to use racial gerrymandering for parties to shadowbox over
these issues.”112
While I am skeptical of the possibility of new congressional legislation to reign in excessive partisanship in electoral processes, I
agree that race-neutral litigation strategies and nonpartisan electoral reforms at the state level are good ideas. State constitutions
often provide more robust protections for voting rights,113 and state
ballot initiatives in places like Florida114 and California115 have been
adopted to reign in partisan gerrymandering.116 Even at the federal
from Seven Mainly Muslim Nations, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2017, 6:12 PM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-trump-refugees-idUSKBN15B2HL [https://perma.cc/J937-8KH4].
110. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Take on Affirmative Action in College
Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/us/politics/trumpaffirmative-action-universities.html [https://perma.cc/7TPB-CPT2].
111. See Issacharoff, supra note 85, at 1407-08.
112. Hasen, supra note 87, at 1879.
113. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND .
L. REV. 89, 101-05 (2014). The ACLU has successfully litigated voting rights cases under raceneutral legal theories based on state constitutional guarantees of the right to vote. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Kobach, No. 2016-CV-550, slip op. at 17 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Nov. 4, 2016) (Third Judicial
Dist. Kan. Website, Recent Court Decisions) (striking down Kansas’s dual registration system
for voting); Chelsea Collaborative v. Galvin, No. 16-3354-D, 2017 WL 4125039, at *32-35
(Mass. Super. Ct. July 24, 2017) (striking down Massachusetts’s twenty-day cutoff for voter
registration).
114. See FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20-21.
115. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI.
116. See Richard L. Hasen, Assessing California’s Hybrid Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV.
1501, 1504 (2009) (book review); Michael Woods, Comment, Gerrymandering (Almost) Gone
Wild: How the Supreme Court Saved Independent Redistricting Reform, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1509,

2018]

RACIAL GERRYMANDERING LITIGATION

1909

level, the Supreme Court’s decision to hear two partisan gerrymandering cases in the October 2017 Term is an encouraging sign.
If nothing else, at a time when courts are likely to grow more conservative,117 litigants should seek to diversify their portfolios in
terms of the strategies that they employ, so as to minimize the risk
to our work arising from adverse precedent.
Again, though, I have caveats. First, I question whether, as a
general matter, voting rights reforms based on appeals to partisan
fairness will be more successful than race-based strategies. In the
vote denial context, “partisan fencing” claims have been brought
numerous times in recent years, challenging various voting practices as unfair efforts to skew the electorate on partisan terms.118 I
am not aware of a single successful such case to date.119 That may
be because of the difficulty of discerning judicially manageable
standards in this context, as essentially any change to elections
procedures governing voter access could have partisan consequences.120 Obviously, I believe that increasing access to the franchise is good in itself, and would distinguish between restrictions on
voting for partisan ends on the one hand, and reforms to increase
access, even if adopted for partisan gain, on the other. But given the
zero-sum nature of our two-party system,121 even increasing access
to the franchise could be viewed by some as “disadvantaging” one
party vis-à-vis the other. Where is a court to draw the line?

1514 (2016).
117. See Carl Hulse, As G.O.P. Moves to Fill Courts, McConnell Takes Aim at an Enduring
Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/us/politics/
mcconnell-federal-judges-trump.html [https://perma.cc/VUK4-ZRKK].
118. See, e.g., Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1093 (D. Ariz.),
aff’d, 840 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2016).
119. See Hasen, supra note 87, at 1877 & n.234 (referencing unsuccessful partisan fencing
claims in Feldman, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1094; Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, 189 F. Supp.
3d 708 (S.D. Ohio 2016), rev’d on other grounds, Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d
620 (6th Cir. 2016); One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Nichol, 186 F. Supp. 3d 958, 974 (W.D. Wis. 2016);
and Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 155 F. Supp. 3d 572, 584 (E.D. Va. 2015), amended by
No. 3:15cv357-HEH, 2016 WL 6921611 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2016)).
120. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion).
121. See, e.g., Eric Cantor, Eric Cantor: What the Obama Presidency Looked Like to the
Opposition, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/14/opinion/sunday/
eric-cantor-what-the-obama-presidency-looked-like-to-the-opposition.html?mcubz=1 [https://
perma.cc/ECC3-WDDA].
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As for redistricting, I, like many others,122 hope that the Supreme
Court will place limits on partisan gerrymandering in Gill v. Whitford.123 But it has never done so before.124 Unless and until it does,
it seems to me that it is difficult to argue confidently, based on past
experience, that voting rights litigation strategies based on partisan fairness represent a more promising vehicle than those based
on race. The latter is fraught with peril, but at least it has been
successful in recent cases, in both the redistricting125 and vote denial
contexts.126 Obviously, Gill may change all that.127 But for now, given the long-established legal prohibition against racial discrimination128 and the absence (as of this writing) of meaningful judicial
limits on excessive partisanship,129 advocates might be better served
by continuing to focus their litigation efforts under battle-tested
race-based legal theories.
I suspect that most people (although certainly not all) have a
sense of fair play in politics and intuit that partisan discrimination
is wrong. But there is a reason that racial and ethnic minorities—
and not members of political parties—are the paradigmatic discrete
and insular class in our constitutional jurisprudence and in our
national imagination. Racial discrimination has a particular place
as the ugliest stain in our national history, meriting the highest
122. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Prominent Republicans Urge Supreme Court to End Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/us/politics/
prominent-republicans-urge-supreme-court-to-end-gerrymandering.html?mcubz=1 [https://
perma.cc/G6ZV-9K6F].
123. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued, No.
16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
124. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (plurality opinion).
125. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481-82 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State
Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794-95 (2017); Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732,
1734 (2016), dismissing appeal from Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015
WL 3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015) (three-judge court); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v.
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262-63 (2015).
126. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 238 (4th Cir. 2016)
(striking down provisions of North Carolina’s elections law as intentionally discriminatory);
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (striking down Texas’s voter
identification law under section 2 of the VRA for racially discriminatory results), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
127. Amy Howe, The Justices Tackle Partisan Gerrymandering Again: In Plain English
(UPDATED), SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 7, 2017, 5:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/
justices-tackle-partisan-gerrymandering-plain-english/ [https://perma.cc/Z4K6-3D2U].
128. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 639-41 (1993).
129. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279.
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levels of protections from our laws and our courts.130 And, given that
many perceive our political system as a zero-sum game between the
parties, it seems to me that, notwithstanding the abstract appeal of
partisan fairness as a concept, appeals to partisan fairness in specific cases may be seen as efforts to advantage one party against the
other. If we frame voting rights disputes along party lines, then we
risk situating these issues within what many might perceive as a
“political thicket”131 of ordinary partisan strife.
Of course, partisan- and race-based strategies are not mutually
exclusive.132 But as long as we are debating comparative likelihood
of success, it is at best unclear at this point that partisan-based
strategies hold the greater promise. The popular backlash (followed
by judicial rulings) against the Muslim ban133 demonstrated that
appeals to nondiscrimination—one of the highest values in our national self-image—remain potent.134 I acknowledge, of course, that
there is not much of an empirical basis for this argument. But as a
civil rights lawyer whose work is social change, abstract calls for
more partisan fairness do not strike me as a more likely catalyst for
such change than do traditional rights appeals based on racial
equality.
III. SOMETHING REALLY OLD: INTENTIONAL RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
Turning back to the second-generation racial gerrymandering
cases, what would such a discrimination-based strategy look like if,
as I suggested above, we considered alternatives to the Shaw I racial predominance inquiry?

130. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 650.
131. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
132. See Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 560-62 (2011).
133. See, e.g., Lauren Gambino et al., Thousands Protest Against Trump Travel Ban in
Cities and Airports Nationwide, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2017/jan/29/protest-trump-travel-ban-muslims-airports [https://perma.cc/QM55XRVK]; Gregory Krieg, Opposition Groups Launch Instant Backlash to New Travel Ban, CNN
(Mar. 6, 2017, 4:50 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/06/politics/backlash-protest-trump-travelban/index.html [https://perma.cc/2PQW-J2ER].
134. See, e.g., Gambino et al., supra note 133.
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Obviously, the second-generation racial gerrymandering cases are
not standard section 2 vote dilution cases, otherwise they would be
brought as such. For the plaintiffs in these cases, the redistricting
plans of concern did not “decrease the number of representatives
th[at] black voters can elect,” but rather “decrease[d] their influence
in [neighboring] white-dominated districts.”135 Thus we may be
seeing something like the long-feared trade-off of greater certainty
for descriptive representation (that is, more minority-preferred candidates, who are typically members of the minority group in question) at a cost of less substantive representation (candidates who,
while not minorities themselves and perhaps not the top choice of
minority voters, are still sympathetic to the interests of minority
communities).136
There is, therefore, a material injury that occurs here beyond the
process-based expressive harms contemplated in the first-generation racial gerrymandering cases.137 That is, it is not simply that the
legislatures thought too much about race, it is that they have engaged in race-conscious decision-making for the purpose of materially reducing the influence of voters of color, and thus their
potential for substantive representation.138 In other words, unlike
in the redistricting plans at issue in the first-generation racial gerrymandering cases, these redistricting plans have a discriminatory effect.139
But that is not all. These redistricting plans might also arise from
discriminatory intent, triggering the most severe constitutional
135. See Kim Soffen, How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People of Political Power,
WASH . POST: WONK BLOG (June 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2016/06/09/how-a-widespread-practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-mightactually-harm-them/?utm_term=.1cff833a26bc [https://perma.cc/R8KE-DZ2Z].
136. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN . L. REV. 1323, 1398
(2016) (citing Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting,
106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2531 (1997)).
137. Cf. Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42, 647, 650 (1993).
138. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 807 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I cannot ignore the Constitution’s clear prohibition
on state-sponsored race discrimination.... This prohibition was ‘[p]urchased at the price of
immeasurable human suffering,’ and it ‘reflects our Nation’s understanding that such
classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual and our society.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
139. See id.
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safeguards.140 Cooper contemplated precisely this possibility, noting
that legislatures
may resort to race-based districting for ultimately political
reasons, leveraging the strong correlation between race and
voting behavior to advance their partisan interests. Or, finally—though we hope less commonly—they may simply seek to
suppress the electoral power of minority voters.141

Cooper did not say that the evidence demonstrated that this was the
case in North Carolina. But it did suggest that it is possible to litigate these cases not only as racial gerrymandering cases, but also
as intentional discrimination claims—what could be called intentional packing or intentional minority-influence dilution claims.142
To be clear, these claims likely could not be brought under a
purely discriminatory results theory pursuant to section 2 of the
VRA. The touchstone for that statutory standard is the opportunity
to elect, which is a relatively clear standard—in that, whether
minority-preferred candidates can actually win an election.143 The
ability to “influence” the outcome of an election without actually
being able to elect one’s preferred candidate is a harder concept to
measure—and therefore does not lend itself to a purely resultsbased claim. It is for similar reasons that the Supreme Court in
Bartlett v. Strickland rejected the notion that section 2 of the VRA
requires states to draw “crossover districts”144—districts where
minority voters constitute less than 50 percent of a hypothetical
140. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642-43.
141. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1480 n.15 (2017) (citation omitted).
142. See id.
143. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
144. See 556 U.S. 1, 23 (2009) (plurality opinion). Prior to Bartlett, the Supreme Court had
held open the possibility that discriminatory-results claims based on influence dilution might
be actionable under section 2 of the VRA. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154
(1993) (assuming without deciding the cognizability of a claim brought by minority voters who
allege that “they could elect their candidate of choice nonetheless if they are [not a majority
of a district but] numerous enough and their candidate attracts sufficient cross-over votes
from white voters”); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.12 (“We have no occasion to consider whether
§ 2 permits, and if it does, what standards should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority
group, that is not sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district, alleging that the use of a multimember district impairs its ability to influence elections.”).
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district’s VAP, but can elect their preferred candidates with
consistent levels of “crossover” support from white voters.145 Given
that ruling, I would expect courts to find that a discriminatory
results claim for influence dilution is similarly not judicially manageable.
But from the proposition that the “appropriate” level of influence
is difficult to measure—and therefore cannot serve as the basis of a
results claim—it does not follow that influence short of an opportunity to elect is a meaningless concept, or that diminishment of influence is not the sort of injury that can be cognizable for purposes
of a discriminatory intent claim. As Justice O’Connor observed in
Thornburg v. Gingles, “the power to influence the political process
is not limited to winning elections.”146 And, in Georgia v. Ashcroft,
the Court noted:
[S]preading out minority voters over a greater number of districts creates more districts in which minority voters may have
the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. Such a
strategy has the potential to increase “substantive representation” in more districts, by creating coalitions of voters who
together will help to achieve the electoral aspirations of the
minority group.147

It is precisely this opportunity to influence elections and build
coalitions in districts adjacent to true minority opportunity districts
that has been diminished in the second-generation racial gerrymandering cases.148
If, in fact, a legislature intentionally seeks to dilute the influence
of minority voters by overpacking them into as few districts as
possible, that seems like a paradigmatic example of intentional racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. While the harm of diminishing influence might be too
145. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion).
146. 478 U.S. at 99 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986)).
147. 539 U.S. 461, 481 (2003) (citing HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN , THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 114 (1967)).
148. See Ho, supra note 64, at 1062-63 (explaining that minority vote dilution is akin to
“outright denial of the ballot” because vote dilution makes minority communities’ votes ineffective).
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difficult to measure from a purely results-based theory of liability,
it is undeniably a form of harm that, in the presence of discriminatory intent, should be a sufficient basis to state a claim. Indeed,
in rejecting the cognizability of a results-based claim based on the
failure to draw crossover districts as judicially unmanageable,
Bartlett expressly noted that its “holding does not apply to cases in
which there is intentional discrimination against a racial minority,”149 and that, “if there were a showing that a State intentionally
drew district lines in order to destroy otherwise effective crossover
districts, that would raise serious questions under both the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”150
Another way of thinking about this issue is that the Gingles
preconditions—which were developed for section 2 results claims for
minority vote dilution—should not be necessary elements for intentional discrimination claims. The first Gingles precondition, for
example, requires a plaintiff to show that a challenged redistricting
plan deprives minority voters of an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, by presenting an alternative districting arrangement that affords such an opportunity. But there is no reason
why this requirement—which was intended to create a judicially
manageable standard for (and limit the reach of) a statutory claim
for discriminatory results—should be understood as placing a limit
on the constitutional prohibition on intentional discrimination
expressed in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.151
As a practical matter, can such claims be won? Evidence of
discriminatory intent is hard to come by, but it does emerge in some
cases. For example, plaintiffs in the ongoing Texas redistricting
litigation successfully brought claims for intentional vote dilution
without relying on the Gingles preconditions before the three-judge
court in that case—but the Supreme Court heard the case in the
149. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 20 (plurality opinion).
150. Id. at 24.
151. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990); Perez v. Abbott,
253 F. Supp. 3d 864, 944 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (three-judge court); Comm. for a Fair & Balanced
Map v. Ill. Bd. of Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 581 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (three-judge court) (per
curiam); Cano v. Davis, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (three-judge court) (per
curiam). But see Johnson v. DeSoto Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs (DeSoto II ), 204 F.3d 1335, 1338-39
(11th Cir. 2000) (requiring that the Gingles preconditions be shown in an intentional vote
dilution case).
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October 2017 Term. Meanwhile, in another redistricting case in
South Carolina, one state representative provided a sworn affidavit
asserting that another state representative admitted that the Republican redistricting strategy post-2010 in that state was to eliminate districts in which Black and white voters voted together to
elect Democrats, and, in the long run, to shift the state’s political
context so that essentially all Democratic candidates would be assumed to be African American, effectively polarizing the parties
along racial lines, with African Americans perpetually confined to
the minority party.152
Where such evidence of discriminatory intent exists, it should be
sufficient to state a claim. And if a state asserts, but cannot establish, that the particular concentration of minorities in a district
was necessary to provide minority voters with an opportunity to
elect their preferred candidates to comply with the VRA, then the
state’s rationale would appear to be a pretext for intentional
discrimination.153 Findings of discriminatory intent are rare, but one
need look no further than the unanimous Fourth Circuit decision
striking down provisions of a North Carolina bill concerning voter
identification and other election procedures, for an example of a
recent finding of discriminatory intent against a state legislature.154
Of course, an advocate of a “party all the time” approach might
view the North Carolina voter ID case, and the South Carolina
redistricting plan, as examples of partisan-based, rather than racebased, discrimination.155 After all, the alleged goal of the state representative in South Carolina was to cement long-term political power
for the Republican Party by marginalizing Democrats as the party
of African Americans only.156 At bottom, is that not just an attempt
to seek partisan advantage, rather than to inflict harm on the basis
of race?

152. See Levitt, supra note 3, at 610 (quoting Affidavit of the Honorable Mia Butler Garrick
¶ 16, Backus v. South Carolina, No. 3:11-CV-03120 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2012), Doc. 147).
153. See id.
154. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 226-27 (4th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
155. See Hasen, supra note 87, at 1876.
156. See Levitt, supra note 3, at 610 (quoting Affidavit of the Honorable Mia Butler Garrick
¶ 16, Backus v. South Carolina, No. 3:11-CV-03120 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2012), Doc. 147).
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The answer to that question depends on one’s definition of
intentional discrimination. If intentional discrimination is understood principally as a bare desire to harm members of a group out
of animosity toward that group, then perhaps one might not understand the North Carolina and South Carolina cases as intentional
discrimination cases. But if we instead understand intentional discrimination as the purposeful attempt to harm members of a group,
regardless of the ultimate reasons motivating that purposeful harm,
then these cases are paradigmatic examples of intentional discrimination.157 Purposefully harming members of one group constitutes
intentional discrimination, regardless of whether one does so out of
spite or for other reasons.158
It might seem like a stretch to suggest that the current Supreme
Court would endorse such a conception of intentional discrimination. But the Court has already come quite close to doing so. The
majority in Cooper observed:
[I]f legislators use race as their predominant districting criterion with the end goal of advancing their partisan interests—
perhaps thinking that a proposed district is more “sellable” as a
race-based VRA compliance measure than as a political gerrymander and will accomplish much the same thing—their
action still triggers strict scrutiny. In other words, the sorting
of voters on the grounds of their race remains suspect even if
race is meant to function as a proxy for other (including political)
characteristics.159

Now, the above-quoted language from Cooper sounds in racial predominance, the process-based injury from the Shaw cases.160 But
the Court’s logic—that using race in a particular way, regardless of
one’s ultimate objective, triggers constitutional scrutiny—would
seem to apply equally to discriminatory intent claims. That is, from
157. See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (arguing that signing a restrictive covenant
that prohibits the sale of a home to minorities constitutes racial discrimination, regardless
of whether it is motivated by animus toward minorities or by a belief that minority homeownership reduces property values).
158. See id.
159. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473 n.7 (2017) (citations omitted).
160. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 641-43 (1993).
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a process-based theory of discrimination, one’s goals in making race
a predominant consideration are irrelevant;161 similarly, one’s ultimate purpose in intentionally selecting members of a racial group
for disfavored treatment are irrelevant.162
To be sure, the level of proof required in discriminatory intent
cases may exceed what is typically necessary in racial gerrymandering cases, because a plaintiff must show not only that the decision
maker took race into account, but also that it acted with the intent
to harm a particular racial group.163 Gerrymandering cases require
evidence only that race was the predominant consideration, without
regard to the motives of the legislature in considering race.164 Indeed, the Court observed this fact in Cooper, noting that “[w]hen
plaintiffs meet their burden of showing that [racial gerrymandering]
has occurred, there is no basis for subjecting them to additional—
and unique—evidentiary hurdles, preventing them from receiving
the remedy to which they are entitled.”165 Bringing an intentional
discrimination claim for minority influence dilution may entail accepting additional evidentiary burdens that are unnecessary for a
standard Shaw claim.
CONCLUSION
It may be the case that the best thing we can do is repurpose the
racial predominance inquiry into one that focuses more on discriminatory racial intent than race-conscious process,166 rather than
seeking to upend the doctrine entirely. But at a minimum, civil
rights advocates should consider broadening their palette to include
intentional discrimination claims to supplement racial gerrymandering claims. Such a move would more accurately capture what is
161. Cf. id.
162. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting
in part).
163. Compare Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-22 (1982) (describing a discriminatory
intent analysis), with Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642-43 (describing a racial gerrymandering analysis).
164. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463-64.
165. Id. at 1480 n.15.
166. The Brennan Center’s amicus brief in Cooper attempts to do precisely this. See generally Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellees at 6-8, Cooper, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (No. 15-1262).
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so offensive about a disingenuous redistricting strategy employed in
so many places post-2010, in which redistricting plans that do great
harm to minority voters have been misleadingly defended as necessary to comply with a caricature of the VRA.167
We should be realistic. We cannot jettison Shaw I overnight, nor
should we yield tactical advantage in particular cases. I am not
suggesting that civil rights advocates refuse to bring racial gerrymandering claims that could provide the shortest route to victory on
behalf of their clients in particular cases. I only suggest that, given
the potential downsides of continuing to reify the process-based
conception of equal protection underlying the racial gerrymandering
cases, we might do well also to explore older legal theories based on
intent.

167. See Levitt, supra note 3, at 609.

